Dissenting opinion on CF‑001: the 15‑Day Pay Standard

To the members of the Cashflow Council

Re: RC/CF/2026/OP.4 — Dissenting opinion on CF-001

Who I am and what happened

I am a small-business owner in Milan and a member of the Cashflow Council. I write in opposition to CF-001 as drafted. I do not oppose the purpose of the proposal. Late payment can place a supplier’s ability to pay wages, rent and tax at the mercy of a buyer’s internal process. A small supplier should not have to finance a larger customer indefinitely, chase an undisputed invoice repeatedly, or accept that payment terms are whatever the buyer chooses to impose.

My disagreement is with the proposed universal deadline of 15 days. It treats the buyer’s size and the nature of the transaction as decisive, while giving too little weight to whether the buyer is itself small, whether its trade is seasonal, and when it receives the money needed to settle its own obligations. The proposal risks treating every delay beyond day 15 as evidence of unfair conduct, even where the buyer is a small enterprise facing a predictable but sharply uneven sales cycle.

I know this tension from experience. In a seasonal trading period, I have had to meet supplier invoices before the relevant sales receipts arrived. The goods and the invoices were not disputed. The issue was timing: cash was committed to stock and other operating costs, while the income that would replenish it depended on the season unfolding. A 15-day deadline would have required payment before that cycle had produced the cash to pay. The choice would have been to borrow, delay another essential payment, or place a future order at risk. None of those choices makes a small buyer more responsible to its suppliers; they simply move the strain elsewhere.

I will not describe the business, its products, its suppliers or its trading arrangements. The point is not that my circumstances should be treated as exceptional. The point is that a rule applied across all large buyers and all undisputed invoices must also be tested against the small buyers and seasonal transactions it will reach in practice.

What the evidence shows

The Council’s evidence establishes that late payment is widespread and that it is not a marginal inconvenience. As of 21 October 2026, Reseated had 1,751 members in 49 countries and had received 5,361 reports from 50 countries. The Cashflow Council had 424 members in 49 countries and 1,354 reports from 50 countries. The median amount at stake in Cashflow reports was approximately US$4,296. These are substantial pressures for businesses operating with limited reserves.

The reported situations are especially important to the design of the standard. Of the 1,354 Cashflow reports, 1,097 concerned a client paying late and 257 concerned supplier terms. This confirms that the principal pattern is a buyer failing to pay its supplier on time. It does not show that every buyer able to pay late is large, or that every buyer is funded by receipts from a larger customer. But the supplier-terms reports do show that payment difficulty is not confined to a simple relationship in which one large buyer can be distinguished from every small business downstream.

The Council’s membership data also makes it difficult to treat small buyers as an edge case. Among Cashflow members, 37% reported a team size of just one person and 42% reported teams of 2–9. A further 16% reported teams of 10–49, and 5% teams of 50–249. The report categories therefore include many very small operations. A standard designed around the capacity of a large buyer cannot assume that the buyer in every supplier relationship has the same capacity.

The recent volume is another reason to act, but not a reason to ignore implementation. There were 96 Cashflow reports in the last 30 days recorded in the 21 October dataset. The reports by country included Canada 174, the United States 167, the United Kingdom 137, India 105, South Africa 58, Australia 58, Spain 57 and Italy 52. The Council has evidence from many jurisdictions and business conditions. That breadth is an argument for a standard that can travel across them without flattening meaningful differences in payment cycles and enterprise size.

For context, the other council totals in the same dataset were Platform 1,961; Fair Play 689; Trade 523; Resilience 359; Red Tape 301; and Team 174. These figures are council reports, not additional Cashflow cases. They show the scale of the Assembly’s work; they do not establish that a single payment deadline is suitable in every market. Nor should the 1,354 Cashflow reports be read as a statistical estimate of the rate of late payment across all businesses. They are evidence submitted to identify recurring problems, and the Council should use them for that purpose without claiming more than they demonstrate.

The reported median amount at stake is also a warning against designing policy only for large balances. Approximately US$4,296 may be a serious sum for a small supplier waiting to be paid. It may also be a serious sum for a small buyer whose cash is tied up until a seasonal sales period concludes. The rule must protect the supplier without pretending that the buyer’s cash position is irrelevant simply because the invoice is undisputed.

How the law in my country and elsewhere handles it

I am writing from Italy, where the most relevant material in this dossier is the proposed EU Late Payment Regulation. The proposal, made in September 2023, sought a hard 30-day cap. The European Parliament set out its position in April 2024, but the proposal was blocked in the Council. The dossier reports an average EU business-to-business payment period of approximately 60.3 days in 2024.¹ Those facts point in two directions. Payment periods can be too long, and a 30-day limit has been proposed as a response. They do not establish that 15 days is the necessary or workable limit for every buyer.

The United Kingdom’s Late Payments Bill, introduced in the House of Lords on 19 May 2026, provides another point of comparison. The dossier describes a maximum 60-day term, mandatory interest at 8% above the base rate, and adjudication and fine powers for the Small Business Commissioner. Import and export contracts are exempt from the cap.² The Bill’s approach recognizes both a limit and enforcement. Its 60-day maximum is not the rule I would propose for all transactions, but it is evidence that a legislature can take late payment seriously without fixing every invoice at 15 days.

India’s framework makes the distinction between agreed terms and no written agreement explicit. Under section 15 of the MSMED Act, micro and small enterprises must be paid within 45 days where there is a written agreement, and within 15 days where there is not. Section 43B(h) of the Income-tax Act, in force since 1 April 2024, links the timing to tax deduction; the dossier also records compound interest at three times the RBI bank rate for late payment.³ This is not a ready-made model for Italy or for every member jurisdiction. It does demonstrate that a 15-day period can be reserved for the absence of a written agreement, rather than imposed as the universal maximum even when parties have agreed a different term.

Australia’s Payment Times Reporting Scheme offers evidence about practice rather than a universal legal deadline. Its August 2026 regulator update reports that 69.8% of small-business invoices were paid within 30 days, the average payment time was 27.2 days, and 96 businesses were identified as Fast Small Business Payers, defined as paying within 20 days.⁴ The figures show that faster payment is achievable and worth recognizing. They also show why a 15-day standard should not be assumed to describe ordinary payment performance: the reported average was 27.2 days, and the fast-payer category used a 20-day threshold. The Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman’s material records payment disputes as approximately 26% of new managed cases in the June 2026 quarter.⁵ That reinforces the case for remedies and clearer processes, not necessarily for one deadline that applies regardless of the buyer’s size or cycle.

These comparisons do not excuse late payment. They show that public approaches in the dossier distinguish among maximum terms, written agreements, interest, enforcement and reporting. CF-001 should do the same with care. A 15-day standard may be a useful commitment for businesses able to meet it. It is not thereby a sound universal rule.

The strongest argument against my view and my answer

The strongest argument against my position is straightforward: suppliers cannot plan their own businesses around a buyer’s seasonal cycle. If a buyer has received an undisputed invoice, it should pay promptly. A 15-day rule is easy to understand, difficult to manipulate and much more protective than open-ended payment terms. Allowing

exceptions for small or seasonal buyers could recreate the very uncertainty that the standard is meant to end. Further, small suppliers often have less access to credit than their customers, so requiring them to wait while a buyer collects its own receipts transfers the financing burden to the party least able to carry it.

I accept the force of that argument. A buyer should not be able to call every cash shortage seasonal, or use its own customer’s delay as a reason to leave a supplier unpaid. If the Council adopts a broad exemption for small buyers, it could weaken the standard and give larger buyers a reason to reorganize their structures to avoid responsibility. A supplier should not have to investigate the buyer’s accounts or prove that its own hardship is greater.

But the answer cannot be to treat all undisputed invoices as if they were issued to buyers with equivalent access to cash. That is not a neutral simplification. It makes the supplier’s short-term financing need decisive and the buyer’s ability to meet the deadline irrelevant. For a small seasonal buyer, a rigid 15-day rule may cause the buyer to pay by using expensive credit, default on another supplier, or stop buying from smaller suppliers altogether. Those outcomes do not guarantee that the supplier will be paid more reliably across the year.

The better answer is a clear default, a narrow and transparent route for agreed longer terms, and an enforceable outside limit. Any exception must be in writing, set before the invoice is issued, and not be imposed unilaterally after delivery. The buyer should not be permitted to extend a term merely by disputing an invoice without a genuine, itemized reason. A small supplier should be able to decline extended terms without losing access to a complaint process. This does not make a seasonal explanation a defence to any delay; it makes payment terms visible in advance and leaves late payment subject to consequences.

Automatic interest is important, but it should follow the term that the parties were lawfully entitled to agree, not turn every day after day 15 into an automatic breach regardless of that term. Publication of payment times is also valuable, but the figures should distinguish business size and report comparable periods and invoice categories. Otherwise, disclosure may reward buyers whose trade happens to generate shorter invoices while obscuring slow payment elsewhere.

My position clause by clause

Clause 1 — payment within 15 days. I oppose the 15-day deadline as a universal requirement for every large buyer and every undisputed invoice. I support a 15-day commitment where buyer and supplier agree to it, and I support making prompt payment the stated objective. For a mandatory baseline, I favour a 30-day maximum, with a narrowly defined written agreement for a longer period where the supplier has agreed before the transaction and the term does not exceed an appropriate statutory ceiling. The Council should not represent the 30-day figure as a proven answer in every jurisdiction; it is a more defensible common standard than a universal 15 days in light of the EU proposal and the evidence in this dossier.

Clause 2 — automatic interest when late. I support automatic interest after the lawful payment deadline has passed. The supplier should not have to make repeated demands to establish that a late payment is late. But the trigger must be the agreed and permitted deadline, not day 15 in every case. The standard should also require buyers to tell suppliers plainly how interest is calculated and to include it without requiring a separate claim. Interest must not be used as a substitute for paying the principal, and an invoice dispute should be specific, timely and limited to the disputed portion.

Clause 3 — publication of payment times. I support publication. Buyers that publish comparable payment performance make it easier for suppliers to assess trading terms before committing. Reporting should show the proportion paid within 15, 30 and 60 days, alongside the average or median time, and should separate undisputed invoices from invoices subject to a genuine dispute. Where feasible, reporting should distinguish payments to micro and small suppliers from payments to larger suppliers. The 15-day measure belongs in that disclosure as a meaningful indicator of strong practice, even if it is not the universal legal deadline.

Clause 4 — scope and protection against avoidance. The standard should cover the buyer’s responsibility for payment and should not allow an enterprise to escape it by routing orders through an affiliate or intermediary. At the same time, it should specify how genuinely small buyers and seasonal transactions are treated. Any different term must be agreed in advance, be visible on the contract or purchase order, and be open to scrutiny. A term imposed after the supplier has committed resources should not qualify. The Council should develop this protection with

evidence and consultation rather than create an exemption broad enough to swallow the rule.

Clause 5 — implementation and review. I oppose adopting a rigid 15-day deadline without a review mechanism. The standard should require public reporting and a scheduled review of its effects on small suppliers and small buyers, including evidence of changed access to credit, supplier participation and payment delays. A rule should be tightened if evidence shows that agreed longer terms are being abused; it should be adjusted if it pushes seasonal small buyers out of supply relationships without improving payment reliability. Review is not a reason to postpone action. It is a way to make the standard accountable to its purpose.

What I ask

I ask members to vote against CF-001 in its current form. I ask the Council not to read this dissent as a defence of late payment or as a claim that suppliers should finance buyers without limit. They should not. The evidence assembled by the Council is serious, and the Assembly is right to seek a rule that gives suppliers more certainty and a remedy when payment is overdue.

What I ask is that the Council distinguish a firm commitment to pay promptly from a universal 15-day legal deadline. Keep 15 days as a visible target and a pledge that businesses can adopt. Make payment terms written, clear and agreed before performance. Set a strict outside limit, require automatic interest once the applicable deadline is missed, and publish comparable payment data. Give small suppliers protection against unilateral extensions and sham disputes. Then review the results against evidence from both sides of the transaction.

Notes and sources

Sources

1. European Parliament Legislative Train — Revision of the Late Payment Directive
2. UK Small Business Commissioner — Late Payments Bill
3. Legal 500 — Payments to micro and small enterprises in India
4. Australian Payment Times Reporting Scheme — August 2026 regulator update
5. Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman — Productivity Commission inquiry submission