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Cashflow Council
Opinion OP.5: A dissent on the 15-Day Pay Standard
RC/CF/2026/OP.5
22 October 2026
Dissenting opinion on CF-001
To the members of the Cashflow Council,
Who I am and what happened
My name is Chen Wei. I am a member of the Cashflow Council in Toronto, Canada. I submit this opinion as a small-business owner, not as a representative of every owner who has reported a late payment. I ask that my position be judged against the evidence and the proposed remedy, rather than against whether I accept that late payment is a serious problem. I do accept that.
What happened, in the ordinary sense, is that payment dates can become uncertain even when the work is complete and the invoice is not in dispute. A small supplier may have finished its part, sent the paperwork, and still be left waiting while a buyer’s internal process determines when the money will move. The supplier has little ability to make that process move faster. Yet the supplier still has obligations of its own: wages, rent, tax, and payments to other businesses. A delay that appears manageable to a large buyer can become a decision about which obligation a small business can meet first.
I do not offer that description as a new statistic, nor do I identify a particular buyer. It is the kind of exposure the Council’s reports are intended to document. My disagreement is about what standard will change the practice without creating a rule that is too rigid to be adopted, applied, or enforced fairly across different transactions. CF-001 combines
three ideas: payment within 15 days of an undisputed invoice, automatic interest when payment is late, and publication of payment times. I support the second and third. I dissent from the first as a universal cap.
What the evidence shows
The Cashflow Council’s figures as of 22 October are substantial. The Council has 424 members from 49 countries and has received 1,356 reports from 50 countries. The median amount at stake is approximately US$4,309. By report count, the leading countries are Canada, 174; the United States, 167; the United Kingdom, 137; India, 105; Australia, 59; South Africa, 58; Spain, 57; and Italy, 53. The reports describe 1,099 client-pays-late situations and 257 supplier-terms situations. In team size, 37% report being just one person, 42% have 2–9 people, 16% have 10–49, and 5% have 50–249. Ninety-three reports were filed in the last 30 days.
These numbers establish a broad and persistent concern. They show that the issue is not confined to one country, one type of business, or one isolated account. They also show why a delay matters: the median amount at stake is material for a small enterprise, and many reporting businesses have very small teams. Those facts support action. They do not, by themselves, establish that 15 days is the right universal deadline, that the same deadline is workable for every kind of buyer-supplier relationship, or that the deadline will be the part of the standard most likely to change conduct.
The distinction matters. A report that records a delayed invoice tells us about a problem and its effects. To select a remedy, we must also ask whether the rule can be followed in varied payment systems, whether a late payer can avoid the consequence by relabelling a delay, and whether the proposed deadline will be adopted by buyers who currently have no such commitment. The Council’s evidence supports the case for a common expectation, but I do not read it as proving the specific choice of 15 days.
The consultation on the draft closed on 24 September, after receiving 362 comments. The adoption ballot is scheduled for 26 October to 9 November. I therefore offer this dissent while there is still an opportunity for members to consider whether the parts of CF-001 should be treated separately. A standard can be firm about consequences and public accountability without declaring that every undisputed invoice in every commercial setting must be paid within the same 15-day period.
How the law in my country and elsewhere handles it
The Council’s records do not include a summary of Canadian late-payment law. The comparisons are useful not because any one jurisdiction settles our question, but because they show that lawmakers have used different combinations of deadlines, interest, reporting, and enforcement.
In the United Kingdom, the Late Payments Bill introduced in the House of Lords on 19 May 2026 would set a maximum payment term of 60 days, require interest at 8% above the base rate, and give the Small Business Commissioner adjudication and fine powers. Import and export contracts are exempt from the cap. The Council’s records also include the government’s late-payment consultation response.1
India’s framework, as described in the sources cited, requires payment to micro and small enterprises within 45 days where there is a written agreement, and within 15 days without one. Section 43B(h) of the Income-tax Act links non-payment to the timing of the buyer’s tax deduction, while the MSMED Act provides compound interest at three times the Reserve Bank of India bank rate.2 This is a combination of a deadline, a financial consequence, and a tax-related incentive. It is not simply a general 15-day rule for all invoices.
At the European Union level, the proposed Late Payment Regulation would establish a hard 30-day cap. The European Parliament adopted its position in April 2024, but the proposal has been blocked in the Council. The EU’s average business-to-business payment time was about 60.3 days in 2024.3 The difference between the proposed limit and observed average is a
reminder that writing a shorter deadline into a rule does not itself ensure that the deadline is met.
Australia offers a reporting comparison. The August 2026 Payment Times Reporting Regulator update states that 69.8% of small-business invoices were paid within 30 days, with an average of 27.2 days, and records 96 Fast Small Business Payers paying within 20 days.4 Separately, the Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman reported that payment disputes represented about 26% of new managed cases in the June 2026 quarter.5 Those figures show both the value and the limits of measurement: reporting can make performance visible, while disputes remain a meaningful part of the small-business caseload.
These cases do not prove that 60, 45, 30, or 15 days is ideal for every market. They do show that policy can combine a maximum term with interest or other consequences, and that publication of payment performance can identify who pays promptly. The strongest common lesson is not that one number should be copied without qualification. It is that a deadline needs an enforceable consequence and reliable information about actual practice.
The strongest argument against my view and my answer
The strongest argument for the 15-day cap is straightforward: small suppliers should not be made to finance large buyers. A longer permitted term gives the buyer control over the supplier’s cash, even when the invoice is valid. A short, simple deadline is easier to explain than a menu of exceptions. It gives every small supplier a clear standard, removes the advantage held by buyers that can impose lengthy terms, and may prompt businesses to change their processes rather than defend them. The Council’s 1,356 reports, spread across 50 countries, make a strong case for a rule that is more ambitious than merely asking buyers to improve.
I take that argument seriously. It is also why I am not proposing voluntary language without consequences. But a rule is not stronger simply because its number is shorter. If a universal 15-day cap does not match the payment
arrangements, approval steps, or legal environments in which buyers operate, it may produce formal objections, narrow compliance, or pressure to expand exceptions. A buyer may contest whether an invoice is undisputed, delay the point at which it is treated as received, or negotiate terms outside the standard. A short cap that is routinely avoided could offer less practical protection than a demanding but workable rule backed by automatic interest and public performance data.
That concern does not mean that buyers should be allowed to manufacture disputes or to keep suppliers waiting without cost. Automatic interest should attach when the applicable deadline is missed, without requiring a small supplier to negotiate for it or initiate a separate claim. Published payment times should reveal whether a buyer pays promptly in practice, not merely what its contract says. Together, those measures change the incentives and make performance visible. They also allow the Assembly to distinguish between a firm that has improved its payment behaviour and one that continues to impose long waits.
Nor am I arguing that 15 days should never be a target. It is a useful benchmark and a meaningful pledge for businesses able to meet it. My dissent is narrower and firm: CF-001 should not require every large buyer to pay every undisputed invoice within 15 days as the universal standard. The Council should not treat support for action as proof that this particular cap is the only effective action.
My position clause by clause
First, on payment within 15 days of an undisputed invoice: I oppose adopting this as a mandatory universal deadline. Fifteen days may be appropriate in some relationships and sectors, and it can serve as a voluntary commitment or performance benchmark. But the draft should recognize a more workable maximum term rather than treating 15 days as the single required limit for all covered transactions. Any rule must define when an invoice is received and what counts as a genuine dispute, so that neither side can manipulate the clock.
Second, on automatic interest when payment is late: I support this clause. Interest should arise automatically once the applicable payment term expires. It should not depend on a small supplier making a further request, having the resources to pursue a claim, or risking a commercial relationship to insist on payment. The standard should specify a clear rate and make plain that raising a bona fide dispute about part of an invoice does not excuse withholding an undisputed part. The exact drafting should prevent routine administrative delay from becoming a cost-free way to borrow from suppliers.
Third, on publishing payment times: I support this clause. A public report should use a consistent method, explain its coverage, and present actual payment performance in a form that can be compared over time. It should not allow a buyer to present only its best-performing division or a selectively defined group of invoices as its overall record. Published information is not a substitute for a remedy, but it gives suppliers, workers, policymakers, and the public a way to assess whether a buyer’s practice matches its stated terms.
Fourth, on implementation and review: I ask the Council to make the standard measurable and revisable. It should specify what evidence a buyer must retain, how a dispute is recorded, and how payment times are calculated. It should provide a review after implementation, using reported payment performance and supplier evidence to assess whether the term is being met and whether the standard is changing conduct. A review should not become a delay tactic; it should be a scheduled test of whether the adopted rule is working.
What I ask
I ask members of the Cashflow Council to separate the objective from the chosen deadline. Please vote for a standard that imposes automatic interest on late payment and requires transparent publication of payment times. Please amend or reject the universal 15-day cap and replace it with a realistic, enforceable maximum term, with 15 days retained as a voluntary pledge or benchmark for buyers able to meet it.
If the Assembly adopts the current text, I ask that my dissent be recorded alongside it. The reports establish that late payment is a serious, widespread problem. They do not require us to pretend that one deadline is suitable in every setting. We should hold buyers to clear consequences, make their performance visible, and choose a standard with a credible prospect of being followed. That is not a weaker response to the evidence. It is a demand that the remedy be judged by what it changes for the small businesses the Council represents.
Respectfully,
Chen WeiCashflow CouncilToronto, Canada